Equal Opportunity and Opportunity Dominance by Voorhoeve, Alex & Hild, M
Economics and Philosophy, 20 (2004) 117–145 Copyright C© Cambridge University Press
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267104001282
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND
OPPORTUNITY DOMINANCE
MATTHIAS HILD* AND ALEX VOORHOEVE†
*Darden Graduate School of Business Administration
†University College London
All conceptions of equal opportunity draw on some distinction between
morally justiﬁed andunjustiﬁed inequalities.Wediscuss how this distinction
varies across a range of philosophical positions. We ﬁnd that these positions
often advance equality of opportunity in tandemwith distributive principles
based onmerit, desert, consequentialist criteria or individuals’ responsibility
for outcomes. The result of this amalgam of principles is a festering
controversy that unnecessarily diminishes the widespread acceptability
of opportunity concerns. We therefore propose to restore the conceptual
separation of opportunity principles concerningunjustiﬁed inequalities from
distributive principles concerning justiﬁable inequalities. On this view, equal
opportunity implies that that morally irrelevant factors should engender no
differences in individuals’ attainment, while remaining silent on inequalities
due to morally relevant factors. We examine this idea by introducing the
principle of ‘opportunity dominance’ and explore in a simple application
to what extent this principle may help us arbitrate between opposing
distributive principles. We also compare this principle to the selection rules
developed by John Roemer and Dirk Van de Gaer.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Equality of opportunity is a popular ideal. Under its banner, many
social movements have, in recent history, made their case for eliminating
inequalities due to race, sex, cultural and religious differences, physical
handicaps and social class. In some form or other, both private and public
institutions in most Western democracies today appeal to this ideal to
regulate the distribution of speciﬁc goods like jobs, educational resources
and positions of political power. Nonetheless, the precise meaning of this
normative concept remains unclear. Equality of opportunity in education,
for example, may mean the absence of discrimination on the basis of race,
religion or gender, but it can also entail the elimination of inequalities due
to family circumstances and social background, or even due to students’
innate physical and mental abilities. Confronted with this plethora of
interpretations, some commentators have called for the abandonment of
the ‘treacherous’ term ‘equal opportunity’ (Jencks 1988; Radcliffe Richards
1997). A further source of controversy is the fact that equal opportunity
is often advanced in tandem with other distributive ideals, such as
merit, desert, some consequentialist principle, or a theory of individual
responsibility.
To help facilitate the debate on these controversies, we will construct
a conceptual framework that allows us to place different notions of equal
opportunity in relation to each other and to disentangle from them other
normative principles that call for separate consideration. We then examine
to what extent equality of opportunity may help us arbitrate between
opposing distributive principles. We also extend this discussion to cases
where we strive for equality of opportunity only in as far as it beneﬁts the
most disadvantaged.
In our view, the common core among different conceptions of equal
opportunity is some distinction between morally justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed
inequalities. When we advocate equal opportunities for a certain good
among some group of people, we imply that certain morally irrelevant
factors should engender no differences in the attainment of this good.
At the same time, we permit unequal attainment as far as it ﬂows from
morally relevant factors. On this account, we start from a list of factors that
inﬂuence individuals’ attainment, and subsequently sort them into three
categories. The ﬁrst category collects all factors that are under the control
of the policymaker. The second category compriseswhat one believesmay
be legitimate sources of differential attainment. The ﬁnal category consists
of all factors whose differential inﬂuence one wishes to eliminate. We will
often refer to the ﬁrst of these categories as policy instruments, and to the
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ﬁnal two categories as relevant and irrelevant factors. Factors, such as race,
take values, such as black and white, to which we refer as ‘characteristics’.
A policy establishes equal opportunity when individuals with the same
relevant characteristics attain the same outcomes, irrespective of their
irrelevant characteristics.1 This abstract deﬁnition at once implies that any
concrete opportunity principle involves the speciﬁcation of the good in
question and of the factors we regard as morally relevant and irrelevant.
Different speciﬁcations of these elements also result in different normative
conceptions of equal opportunity.
Our discussion will proceed as follows. In section 2, we canvass
a range of positions on what ought to be legitimate and illegitimate
sources of unequal outcomes. In section 3, we critically examine John
Roemer’s construction of individuals’ relevant characteristics. In section 4,
we illustrate the separation between equality of opportunity and other
distributive principles with an example of racial income differentials in
the USA in 1999. In section 5, we introduce the principle of ‘opportunity
dominance’ that prioritizes those individualswho aremost disadvantaged
among their peers with identical relevant characteristics. In section 6,
we critically discuss the selection rules developed by John Roemer and
Dirk Van de Gaer. In section 7, we discuss the evaluation of behavioural
responses to policy interventions and the limitations of the strong Pareto
principle. We conclude with section 8.
2. RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS
Some recent contributions to the social-choice literature have concentrated
on the conception of relevant factors as either individuals’ preferences or
choices (Roemer 1993, 1996; Fleurbaey 1994). While such conceptions may
suit some applications, the generic notion of equal opportunity makes
no such general commitment (Roemer 2002, 2003; Fleurbaey 1995a, 1995b,
1998). In the debate on equal opportunity in higher education, for example,
not only preferences for more or less schooling, but also innate capacities
are cited as legitimate grounds for differential attainment. In order to chart
the range of different positions, we will now review some of the rationales
offered for distinguishing between moral relevance and irrelevance.
1 Formally, we can express this deﬁnition as follows (see also Bossert 1995 and Fleurbaey
1995a: 30). LetY =〈Y1, . . . ,YM〉 be a vector ofmorally relevant factors and Z=〈Z1, . . . , ZN〉
be a vector ofmorally irrelevant factors that can inﬂuence the individuals’ attainment of the
good in question. Let  be a set of feasible policies. Then u(φ, y, z) measures the attainment
of a particular good under policy φ ∈ by an individual with a combination Y = y of
relevant characteristics and a combination Z= z of irrelevant characteristics. A policy φ
satisﬁes strict equality of opportunity exactly if u(φ, y, z)=u(φ, y, z′) for any combination of
relevant characteristics y and any combinations of irrelevant characteristics z and z′ (as
long as some individual displays 〈y, z〉 and 〈y, z′〉).
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One approach starts from some moral conception of the good to
be distributed and deduces from it the legitimate sources of inequality.
BernardWilliams (1973) andMichaelWalzer (1984), for instance, argue that
distributive criteria for a good follow from its ‘nature’ or ‘social meaning’.
In their view, we determine the right and wrong grounds for a good’s
distribution by taking account of the aims and interests the good is meant
to serve, of any symbolic role it may play in the social life of a community,
and of the values of those engaged in its production, distribution and
consumption. Irrelevant factors are those whose differential inﬂuence
would undermine these interests, purposes and values. Thus, Williams
deﬁnes equal opportunity as theprinciple that bars ‘‘exclusion [fromaccess
to a good] on grounds other than those appropriate or rational for the
good in question’’ (244). Byway of illustration,Williams andWalzer apply
this type of reasoning to education, citing ability and a desire to learn as
relevant grounds for differential achievements, and parental income as an
irrelevant factor.
Another approach applies to the distribution of generic goods like
well-being or multi-purpose resources, like income, that are less likely to
be tied up with speciﬁc ‘social meanings’. Instead, the moral relevance
of factors is judged by their relation to human attitudes and collective
or individual responsibility. What Cohen (2001) calls right-liberal equality
of opportunity aims to eliminate inequalities due to social status and
unfounded negative or positive attitudes towards others’ characteristics.
It thus bars the differential inﬂuence of race, class, religion, and sex,
considered in and by themselves. By contrast, it permits differential
outcomes due to family and social circumstances, innate and developed
abilities, individuals’ beliefs, preferences, and motivation, and good
or bad fortune. The left-liberal catalogue of irrelevant characteristics
stretches further, including also family and social circumstances. Left-
liberals typically try to distinguish between socially and naturally caused
inequalities. They admit that this distinction may be hard to make, since
human institutions signiﬁcantly determine the degree to which ‘natural’
factors like innate talents and good or bad fortune affect outcomes.
Whenever this distinction can be drawn, however, left-liberals argue that
society can legitimately ‘‘pass the buck to nature’’ for naturally, but not
socially caused inequalities (Nagel 1997: 314; Mansbridge 1988: 134).2
Finally, what Cohen calls socialist equality of opportunity considers native
2 In an alternative argument for left-liberal equal opportunity, Rawls (1999) and Green (1989)
argue that, like discrimination, social class and family circumstances stand in the way of
individuals’ equal development of their natural abilities. They stress that left-liberal equal
opportunity should not apply to social goods other than positions. The close connection
between positions and personal development makes the form of their argument more akin
to Williams’s and Walzer’s approach.
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differences and good or bad fortune to be just as irrelevant as social bias
or family circumstances. On this view, preference or choice count as the
only morally relevant factors because, it is argued, an individual may be
held responsible for at least some of their consequences, although some
authors differ on the pre-conditions for and the extent of this responsibility
(Dworkin 2000; Cohen 1989; Arneson 1989).
The moral relevance of an individual’s characteristics is sometimes
questionedwhendifferences in relevant characteristics causally depend on
irrelevant factors. This problem arises, for instance, for a left-liberal view
in which family circumstances are irrelevant but individuals’ preferences
and motivation are relevant. Equality of opportunity in our sense would
thenpermit that individualswithdifferent preferences advance todifferent
levels of education. Since differences in motivation and preferences stem
partly from irrelevant differences in family circumstances, some are led
to doubt the relevance of individual beliefs and preferences. In response
to this concern, John Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003) sets out to
redeﬁne the set of prima facie relevant factors in order to purify it
from any indirect inﬂuence by irrelevant factors. His method has been
applied in a number of innovative studies on health care, educational
achievement, development aid, and income distribution (Roemer 1999;
Betts andRoemer 2001; Llavador andRoemer 2001; Roemer et al. 2003; Van
de Gaer, Schokkaert and Martinez 2001). In the following section, we will
argue that Roemer’s puriﬁcation method misses its target, except under
fortuitous circumstances.More importantly, puriﬁcation of relevant factors
is not necessarily desirable. In higher education, for instance, left-liberals
may stand by the moral relevance of preferences whatever their origin
because, so they argue, the aims of higher education require differential
treatment for students with different preferences (Barry 1988: 40–1). If,
as Williams and Walzer suggest, the choice of relevant characteristics is
based on the aims and values that are associated with a particular good,
then puriﬁcation runs the risk of undermining the reasons for adopting a
principle of equal opportunity in the ﬁrst place.
3. ROEMER ON ‘RELATIVE EFFORT’
Over the past decade, Roemer has proposed two versions of hismethod for
stemming the inﬂuence of irrelevant on relevant characteristics. He ﬁrst
developed his method while working within the socialist conception of
equal opportunity, permitting inequalities only on the basis of different
choices or preferences. The problem of indirect inﬂuence then takes
the following form. Since choices and preferences are the product of
individuals’ information, cognitive abilities and socialization, they are
differentially inﬂuenced by irrelevant factors. Roemer concludes that
we cannot take as relevant the choices of individuals with different
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irrelevant characteristics. Instead,we shouldﬁnd somepuriﬁedmeasure of
individuals’ choices that is free from the differential inﬂuence of irrelevant
characteristics.
To this end, Roemer ﬁrst sorts individuals into ‘types’ by their
irrelevant characteristics, e.g., by race.He then selects some choice variable,
e.g., schooling, that contributes to differences in outcomes, e.g., income,
and calls this variable ‘effort’.He ranks individualswithin a type according
to the effort they expend. This ranking allows him to partition people
within each type into quantiles of effort relative to their type. A person
then belongs to the 10%-quantile of relative effort exactly if 10% of the
entire population expend at most as much effort as this person. The
individual’s ‘relative effort’ is then measured by the individual’s effort
quantile. Relative effort, Roemer argues, is an appropriatemeasure of ‘how
hard an individual has tried’ to achieve the outcome in question. Finally,
he recognizes relative effort as the only relevant factor and concludes
that equal opportunity obtains when all people who expend the same
degree of relative effort also receive the same outcome (Roemer 1998: 15–
16). In later work, Roemer (2002, 2003) switches to a different measure
and deﬁnes relative effort as the quantile that individuals occupy in their
type’s outcome distribution. In contrast to his earlier method, this later
approach no longer relies on the assumption that outcomes are adequately
predicted by only one choice variable. If, among other things, we assume
that, within each type, outcome is some increasing function of whatever it
is we consider ‘effort’, then an individual’s position in the distribution of
outcome also reveals his position in the distribution of effort.
In recent papers, Roemer has abandoned his focus on the socialist
conception of equal opportunity and has argued that we can apply his
method to any catalogue of irrelevant factors. The only difference is that
individuals’ relative effort will not only be determined by choice-related
variables, but by all factors that inﬂuence individuals’ rank in their type’s
outcome distribution. Indeed, in appliedwork, Roemer uses this approach
to analyse equal opportunity for income when parental education, as a
proxy for social class and family background, is the only irrelevant factor
(Roemer et al. 2003). Van de Gaer, Schokkaert andMartinez (2001) likewise
apply this method in the analysis of equal opportunity for income among
individualswhoseparents are fromdifferent social classes. It is unfortunate
that these studies continue to use the earlier terminology of ‘effort’. The
term ‘effort’ is surely a misnomer for the amalgam of the many residual
factors, like innate ability, that are not used in the construction of types
but which also inﬂuence income. However, the problems with Roemer’s
methodology run much deeper than this terminological point. As Marc
Fleurbaey (1998) points out, it is only under very special circumstances that
the method of relative effort correctly identiﬁes the inﬂuence of irrelevant
factors. One of these assumptions is that the relevant factors that are not
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differentially inﬂuenced by irrelevant factors and which therefore require
no puriﬁcation are also statistically uncorrelated with irrelevant factors.
To illustrate this limitation, suppose we are interested in equal
opportunity for health, interpreted as the chance of contracting a serious
disease, and believe that different health risks are only permissable when
they are caused by different preferences for healthy over unhealthy
behaviour. (We are here dealing with health risks rather than health
outcomes, under the assumption that what can be controlled by health
care policy and behaviour is the risk of contracting a serious illness and
not the health outcomes themselves.) Suppose that, for every individual,
the chance of contracting a serious illness is an identical function of
just two variables, the amount of cigarettes she smokes and government
policy, with the risks to an individual’s health increasing in the amount
of cigarettes smoked. Individuals’ choice of cigarette consumption is
determined by their preferences over health and cigarettes, and by their
beliefs about the hazards of smoking. Individuals in one third of the
population appreciate the risks of smoking correctly, but smoke 10–
20 cigarettes per daywith little regard for their health. Another third of the
population correctly appreciates the risks of smoking, is health conscious
and smokes 0–5 cigarettes per day. The remaining third of the population,
all ofwhomarehealth conscious, is targetedby cigarettemanufacturers in a
misleading advertising campaign that leads them tounderestimate the true
risks of smoking. Although this campaign leaves preferences unchanged,
it affects choices via differences in information and leads to a consumption
of 5–15 cigarettes per day.
To apply Roemer’s method, we type individuals by exposure and non-
exposure to the campaign, and then determine their rank in their type’s
distribution of cigarette consumption (or in the distribution of their health
risk, which yields the same result in this example).We then choose a policy
that equalises the health risks of all individuals with the same rank in this
distribution. Let us now look at some individuals from different types
whom Roemer considers to have tried equally hard to stay healthy, for
instance, the heaviest smokers of either type. In the unexposed type, these
people smoke 20 cigarettes per day; in the exposed type, they consume
only 15 cigarettes per day. Roemer’s method thus implies that exposure to
the mis-information campaign was advantageous!
The source of this anomaly lies, of course, in the statistical correlation
between the relevant factor of preference for health and the irrelevant factor
of exposure. Roemer’s method implies that, under equal opportunity,
both the exposed and unexposed type should display the same pattern of
outcomes. When relevant and irrelevant factors are statistically correlated,
however, differences in the distribution of outcomes have the dual source
of, on the onehand, the reprehensible inﬂuence of irrelevant factors and, on
the other hand, uneven frequencies of relevant factors. Equal opportunity
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does not require us to equalise just any statistical distribution of outcomes,
but allows for differences due to non-identically distributed relevant
factors. To equalise opportunity, any two individuals with different
irrelevant characteristics must receive equal outcomes if their relevant
characteristics are also equal. The problem identiﬁed here also arises
in applied work on opportunity for income in which Roemer and his
co-authors use parental education, a proxy for social class and family
circumstances, to type their population by irrelevant characteristics. While
individuals’ income depends partly on their genetics and innate abilities,
sociological research indicates that genetic differences are statistically
correlated with, although not caused by, parental education (Saunders
1996; Flynn 2000). Equalising the income distribution between types
with different levels of parental education would then inappropriately
compensate for the effects of innate ability. The same criticism also applies
to the use of Roemer’s method by Van de Gaer, Schokkaert and Martinez
(2001).
4. DISTINCT DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES
Equal opportunity, as we have deﬁned it, forbids unequal outcomes due to
irrelevant factors, but is agnostic about inequalities due to relevant factors.
The source of this agnosticism is the goal of exploring to what extent
the notion of equal opportunity can help us arbitrate between opposing
distributive principles. By our deﬁnition, many allocations with very
different returns to relevant characteristics can establish equal opportunity,
so long as they equalise the effect of irrelevant characteristics. Rather than
declaring indifference between such distributions, our notion of equal
opportunity says nothing about their relative merits. By implication, we
will usually not be able to select a unique policy by opportunity criteria
alone. In order tomake aunique choice,wewill have todrawonadditional,
distinct distributive principles to help us specify a particular relationship
between outcomes and relevant factors. As one would expect, particular
conceptions of equal opportunity are therefore often advanced in tandem
with, or as part of, other distributive principles based on merit, desert,
consequentialist criteria, or on individuals’ responsibility for outcomes
(Roemer 1998; Cohen 1989; Arneson 1989; Mason 2001). This bundling
of normative principles strains and sometimes blurs their conceptual
separation, leading to someunfounded criticismof equal opportunity. John
Schaar (1967), for instance, criticises equal opportunity for leading to large
inequalities of outcomes. This criticism is misplaced, since it is perfectly
possible to combine an equal-opportunity principle with an additional
distributive principle that is averse to inequalities of outcomes. Marc
Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert also emphasise this separation of normative
principles by exposing what they see as an internal tension between
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High School High School College Associate Bachelor’s
No Degree w/Degree No Degree Degree or More Total
WHITE
number (’000) 23,816 52,642 31,574 12,218 39,338 159,588
percentage 12.5% 27.7% 16.6% 6.4% 20.7% 84.0%
income $14,885 $23,822 $27,930 $32,116 $54,208 $31,426
BLACK 0
number (’000) 4,655 7,581 4,812 1,401 3,398 21,847
percentage 2.5% 4.0% 2.5% 0.7% 1.8% 11.5%
income $11,948 $19,934 $24,445 $29,155 $42,361 $23,306
OTHER 0
number (’000) 1,299 1,985 1,541 598 3,093 8,516
percentage 0.7% 1.0% 0.8% 0.3% 1.6% 4.5%
income $13,129 $20,199 $22,330 $28,769 $49,966 $30,919
TOTAL 0
number (’000) 29,770 62,208 37,927 14,217 45,829 189,951
percentage 15.7% 32.7% 20.0% 7.5% 24.1% 100.0%
income $14,349 $23,232 $27,260 $31,684 $53,043 $30,469
TABLE 1. US Income in 1999 (US Census Bureau).
the elimination of unjust inequalities and principles of responsibility
(Fleurbaey 1994, 1995a,b, 1998; Bossert 1995; Bossert and Fleurbaey 1996).
We illustrate this separation of issues by looking at the relationship
between schooling, race and the mean income of workers in the USA
who were at least 18 years of age in 1999. As the data in Table 1 show,
whites earn a substantially higher mean income than members of racial
minorities with the same educational qualiﬁcations. Blacks and ‘others’
(which include Asians and Paciﬁc islanders) alternate in having the lowest
mean income at a given educational level. Others have the highest mean
level of schooling, while blacks have the lowest mean level of schooling.
The causes of this pattern of educational achievement and mean income
are complex, and include factors correlated with race and educational
levels, such as parental income and education, individuals’ preferences
and information, and the quality of the educational institutions attended.
Furthermore, the use of mean incomes suppresses information about
different distributions of income for members of different racial categories
at each level of schooling. Our only purpose in choosing the present table,
an extract from a much richer database, is to provide a simple illustration
of our conceptual point and its application in the political debate. With
this aim in mind, we make the following simplifying assumptions. First,
we are exclusively concerned with the distribution of mean income,
based on education as the only relevant factor and on race as the only
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irrelevant factor. Second, we assume that redistribution of income has a
constant variable cost. Thus, for each dollar collected, only ρ dollars are
available for redistribution while the remainder (1 − ρ) covers the cost of
the intervention. For concreteness,wewill assume that this cost amounts to
20 cents per dollar redistributed (ρ = 0.8). Finally,we assume that transfers
do not affect individuals’ educational levels (i.e. there are no disincentive
effects of taxation). We will lift this overly restrictive assumption in
section 7.
To start with, we consider income transfers on the basis of both
race and education. Although these policy instruments may not be
feasible in the current political climate, they are theoretically interesting
because they are able to achieve many different income distributions
with equalised opportunities. The choice of a unique policy unavoidably
involves a stance on how to reward education and how to structure
the relationship between outcomes and relevant characteristics. Table 2
shows the income distributions corresponding to two particular equal-
opportunity policies.3 The ﬁrst, traditional egalitarianism, equalises the
income of all individuals at the highest possible level. The egalitarian
3 Let 1, . . . , k, . . . K be a list of the possible values of the irrelevant race variable and
1, . . . , l, . . . L be a list of the possible values of the relevant education variable. In our
example, K = 3 and L = 5. Unless mentioned otherwise, the indices k and l range over
{1, . . . ,K} and {1, . . . ,L}. I is a K × L matrix with incomes in the status quo depending
on combinations of relevant and irrelevant characteristics and N is a K × L matrix with
number of the individuals possessing these combinations of characteristics. Policies are
now of the form φ ∈RK×L and the set of feasible policies  satisﬁes the budget constraint∑
kl max(φkl , ρ · φkl ) · Nkl = 0. Income under policy φ is given by I φ := I + φ. A negative
transfer r ∈R− makes an amount of ρ · (−r ) available for redistribution. The contribution of
an arbitrary transfer r ∈R to the budget is therefore min(−r,−ρ · r ) = −max(r, ρ · r ). Since
under our assumptions taxing individuals who are better off for a given level of education
always increases the budget with which we can aid the less-well-off at that educational
level, equal opportunity need not always be achieved through ‘leveling down’. Egalitarians
maximise µ within the budget constraint
∑
kl Nkl · max(µ − Ikl , ρ(µ − Ikl )) = 0. Using
non-linear optimisation algorithms, we ﬁnd µ≈ 29,288.
It is interesting to note that given our assumption of the same variable cost of
redistribution for all characteristics, we can show that the unique cheapest equal-
opportunity policy is self-ﬁnancing in relevant characteristics. A policy with the latter
property equalises the income among individuals with the same relevant characteristic
by using only transfers among these individuals. In other words, each group of
individuals with the same level of education pays to redress the inequalities within its
own ranks: college attendees pay for college attendees and dropouts pay for dropouts.
In proving this result, we make use of the concept of opportunity dominance set out
in section 5. In search of the cheapest policy that is undominated in opportunity (or
OD-policy for short), our task is to minimise B(φ) := −∑kl min(φkl , 0) · Nkl within the
budget constraint such that (+) I φkl = I φk′l for all k, k′, l. The budget constraint induces
a non-linear boundary, thus complicating our optimisation problem. It is very helpful
to note: The unique solution to this optimisation problem is identical to self-ﬁnancing by
relevance.
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High School High School College Associate Bachelor’s
No Degree w/Degree No Degree Degree or More Total
Leximinism
WHITE
income $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288
change $14403 $5466 $1358 $-2828 $-24920 $-2138
BLACK
income $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288
change $17340 $9354 $4843 $133 $-13073 $5982
OTHER
income $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288
change $16159 $9089 $6958 $519 $-20678 $-1632
TOTAL
income $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288 $29288
change $14939 $6055 $2027 $-2396 $-23756 $-1182
Utilitarianism Constrained by Equal Opportunity
WHITE
income $14247 $23113 $27127 $31594 $52802 $30551
change $-638 $-709 $-803 $-522 $-1406 $-875
BLACK
income $14247 $23113 $27127 $31594 $52802 $27269
change $2299 $3179 $2682 $2439 $10441 $3964
OTHER
income $14247 $23113 $27127 $31594 $52802 $33865
change $1118 $2914 $4797 $2825 $2836 $2946
TOTAL
income $14247 $23113 $27127 $31594 $52802 $30322
change $-102 $-120 $-134 $-90 $-241 $-147
TABLE 2. Income Transfers Based on Race and Education.
Proof : We note that (++) neither φ ≥φ′ nor φ′ ≥φ for any φ, φ′ ∈  with φ = φ′. Suppose
φ′ ∈  is an OD-policy that minimises the budget B(.) and differs from the self-ﬁnancing
policy φ. Let I φl := I φ1l and I φ
′
l := I φ
′
1l denote the income of individuals with relevant
characteristic l under these two OD-policies. By ((++)), there exists some l such that
I φ
′
l > I
φ
l and some l
′ such that I φ
′
l ′ < I
φ
l ′ . Clearly, some of the l’-individuals must receive
negative transfers under φ’. We now deﬁne a policy φ’’ that, ﬁrst, agrees with φ’ in the
treatment of all characteristics l’’ that differ from both l and l’ (φ′′kl ′′ :=φkl ′′ for all l ′′ = l, l ′
and all k) and, second, agrees with φ in the treatment of characteristic l (φ′′kl :=φkl for all k).
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intervention involves a high volume of redistributed income and carries a
cost of $1,182 per person (as shown in the margin of the table). The second
policy intervention (‘Utilitarianism Constrained by Equal Opportunity’),
for instance, allows income to vary with education, still equalising the
income of whites, blacks and others. Debates about a particular policy
choice thus cannot be conclusively settled by appealing to the equality of
everyone’s opportunities.
Through its agnostic impartiality, our notion of equal opportunity
may help to arbitrate at least some ideological conﬂicts. The controversy
surrounding traditional utilitarianism is a case in point. A common
criticism of this position notes that even the most inequitable allocation
of resources may maximise average utility. While certain inequalities may
seem tolerable, others are blatantly unjust. If we measure personal utility
in our example by personal income, then average utility is maximised
when the cost of redistribution is minimised. Given free reign, the
utilitarian formula therefore selects the status quo without any income
transfers, leaving signiﬁcant racial inequalities in place. If one sympathises
with the utilitarian outlook but objects to racial inequalities, then equal
opportunity may provide the right constraint to reign in any utilitarian
excesses. Equal opportunity could pre-select a set of candidate policies
that eliminate any unacceptable inequalities while the ﬁnal choice from
this this restricted set would fall to the utilitarian calculus. In our example,
this hierarchical procedure selects the policy that minimises the cost of
equalising opportunity, i.e., the cheapest redistributive policy underwhich
all individuals with the same level of education receive the same income.
The selected policy is the second of the two policies considered above and
Compared to φ′, this policy redistributes δ := ∑k [max(φ′kl , ρ · φ′kl ) − max(φkl , ρ · φkl )] · Nkl
less income among individuals with characteristic l where δ > 0. We ﬁnally use these
savings to increase the equalised income of individuals with characteristics l ′ (the values
of φ′′kl ′ are ﬁxed by (+)). Since some of these payments go to l ′-individuals who receive
negative transfers under φ′, φ′′ must have a lower budget B(φ′′) than φ′. Contradiction!
The condition that a policy be self-ﬁnancing in relevant characteristics requires that∑
k max(φkl , ρ · φkl ) · Nkl = 0 for every l. By (+), we know that φ2l = I1l − I2l + φ1l and
φ3l = I1l − I3l + φ1l . In the current example, a quick calculation shows that we must
have φ1l < 0 and φ2l , φ3l > 0. Self-ﬁnancing then implies φ1l · (N1l · ρ + N2l + N3l )+
N2l (I1l − I2l ) + N3l (I1l − I3l ) = 0 where φ1l = N2l (I2l − I1l )+ N3l (I3l − I1l )N1l ·ρ + N2l + N3l .
Policies that are self-ﬁnancing in education may be of interest in their own right. Bossert
and Fleurbaey (1996), for instance, propose a similar criterion favouring a policy that
leaves the average payoff to education in the status quo untouched. Their reward schema
is equivalent to self-ﬁnancing in relevant characteristics if redistributive inefﬁciencies are
absent. Since, in the presence of inefﬁciencies, a policy satisfying Bossert and Fleurbaey’s
criterion does not always exist, self-ﬁnancing in relevant characteristics may be of
interest.
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FIGURE 1. Income Transfers Based on Race and Education.
shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 under ‘Utilitarianism Constrained by Equal
Opportunity’.
5. OPPORTUNITY DOMINANCE
Inequalities can becomepowerful symbols of society’s concern for fairness.
When motivated by this symbolism or by some ideal fairness norm,
we might want to eliminate inequalities caused by discrimination, for
example, even if we have to hurt the victims of discrimination themselves,
simply to indicate that discrimination is unacceptable (Wolff 2001). When
our aim is, however, to aid the most disadvantaged, we not only tolerate
but welcome certain departures from strict equality. From the viewpoint of
individuals on a particular educational level, for instance, we then prefer
a policy that increases the income of the most disadvantaged racial group.
Following this train of thought, we may say that a policy φ is at least as
good as a policy ψ conditional on a combination of relevant characteristics
y if the worst-off y-individuals under φ are at least as well off as the
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worst-off y-individuals under ψ (where an y-individual is an individual
with a combination of characteristics y). On a moment’s reﬂection, it is
clear that this ‘conditional maximin’ criterion fails to distinguish between
two policies that lead to the same lowest level of income, but differ in
their second lowest income level. The ‘conditional leximin’ rule offers the
perhaps best-known solution to this limitation, tending ﬁrst to the most
disadvantaged, then to the second-most disadvantaged etc. (Sen 1970): A
policy φ is better than a policy ψ conditional on a combination of relevant
characteristicsy exactlywhen theworst-off y-individualsunderφ arebetter
off than theworst-off y-individuals underψ and, in case of a tie, the second
worst-off y-individuals under φ are better off than the second worst-off y-
individuals under ψ , etc. We say that φ is as good as ψ conditional on y just
in case the worst-off y-individuals under φ are as well off as the worst-off
y-individuals under ψ and the second worst-off y-individuals under φ are
as well off as the second worst-off y-individuals under ψ , etc. We say that
φ is at least as good as ψ conditional on y exactly if φ is as good as or better
than ψ conditional on y.4
For each educational level, this rule ranks policies by their effect on
racial income differentials. Typically, however, no policy is best for all
4 As before, let Y =〈Y1, . . . ,YM〉 be a vector of morally relevant factors and Z=〈Z1, . . . , ZN〉
be a vector of morally irrelevant factors that can inﬂuence the individuals’ attainment
of the good in question. Let  be a set of feasible policies. Then u(φ, y, z) measures the
attainment of a particular good under policy φ ∈ by an individual with a combination
Y = y of relevant characteristics and a combination Z= z of irrelevant characteristics.
Let φ,ψ ∈ , let Nφy be the number of y-individuals under policy φ and let Nψy be
the number of y-individuals under policy ψ , allowing for behavioural responses to
policies that change relevant characteristics. Number the y-individuals under φ by
1, . . . , Nφy and number the y-individuals under ψ by 1, . . . , N
ψ
y . The comparisons of
inequalities across groups of different sizes poses a common difﬁculty for inequality
measures (cf. Sen 1973). In our case, it compromises the ability of the leximin rule
to yield complete conditional orderings (cf. section 7). Let σ be a permutation of
{1, . . . , Nφy } such that u(φ, yσ (1), zσ (1))≤ . . .≤u(φ, yσ (Nφy ), zσ (Nφy )) and let τ be a permutation
of {1, . . . , Nψy } such that u(ψ, yτ (1), zτ (1))≤ . . .≤u(ψ, yτ (Nψy ), zτ (Nψy )). Then φ is better than
ψ conditional on Y = y exactly when there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ min(Nφy , Nψy ) such that
u(φ, yσ (i), zσ (i))>u(ψ, yτ (i), zτ (i)) and, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i,u(φ, yσ ( j), zσ ( j)) = u(ψ, yτ ( j), zτ ( j)).
This strict relation is asymmetric and transitive. When Nφy = Nψy and φ and ψ are not better
than each other conditional on y, we say that φ is as good as φ conditional on Y = y but refrain
from such comparisons for policies that differentially affect the number of individuals with
characteristic y. We say that φ is at least as good as ψ conditional on Y = y exactly if ψ is
either not better than or as good as φ conditional on Y = y. This relation is transitive, but
not complete. We say that φ opportunity-dominates ψ exactly if φ is at least as good as ψ
conditional on every value Y = y (displayed by some individual) and φ is better than ψ
conditional on some value Y = y′ (displayed by some individual). Opportunity-dominance
is transitive, but not complete. Finally, φ is opportunity-undominated, or opportunity-optimal,
just in case there exists no ψ ∈ that opportunity dominates φ. If there are only ﬁnitely
many feasible policies, the set of opportunity-undominated policies is non-empty, even
when feasible policy instruments are too blunt to establish strict equality of opportunity.
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FIGURE 2. Income Transfers Based on Race.
combinations of relevant characteristics. As an illustration, we continue
our earlier example, but now consider redistributions of income based on
the irrelevant factor of race alone. (More realistic policies, like income
taxes etc., encounter the exact same problems whenever they react
to characteristics that are correlated with irrelevant factors.) Feasible
policies now add the same, perhaps negative, amount to the income
of every individual of the same race. To maximise the income of the
most disadvantaged individuals with the lowest recorded educational
achievement, whites must pay $501, blacks must receive $2,436 and others
must receive $1,255. This is the ‘Cheapest OD-policy’ in Table 3 and
Figure 2. (We will explain below the meaning of the names given to
the policies in this table and ﬁgure.) While this redistribution is the best
possible policy for the lowest educational level, the most disadvantaged
individuals on the next highest level proﬁt more from ‘Roemer’s policy’
shown in the same table and ﬁgure. When one policy is not uniformly
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High School High School College Associate Bachelor’s
No Degree w/Degree No Degree Degree or More Total
Cheapest OD–Policy
WHITE
income $14384 $23321 $27429 $31615 $53707 $30925
change $-501 $-501 $-501 $-501 $-501 $-501
BLACK
income $14384 $22370 $26881 $31591 $44797 $25742
change $2436 $2436 $2436 $2436 $2436 $2436
OTHER
income $14384 $21454 $23585 $30024 $51221 $32174
change $1255 $1255 $1255 $1255 $1255 $1255
TOTAL
income $14384 $23146 $27203 $31546 $52879 $30385
change $35 $-87 $-57 $-138 $-165 $-84
Roemer
WHITE
income $12945 $21882 $25990 $30176 $52268 $29486
change $-1940 $-1940 $-1940 $-1940 $-1940 $-1940
BLACK
income $21855 $29841 $34352 $39062 $52268 $33213
change $9907 $9907 $9907 $9907 $9907 $9907
OTHER
income $16789 $23859 $25990 $32429 $53626 $34579
change $3660 $3660 $3660 $3660 $3660 $3660
TOTAL
income $14506 $22915 $27051 $31146 $52360 $30143
change $157 $-318 $-209 $-537 $-684 $-326
Van de Gaer
WHITE
income $13728 $22665 $26773 $30959 $53051 $30269
change $-1157 $-1157 $-1157 $-1157 $-1157 $-1157
BLACK
income $18911 $26897 $31408 $36118 $49324 $30269
change $6963 $6963 $6963 $6963 $6963 $6963
OTHER
income $12479 $19549 $21680 $28119 $49316 $30269
change $-650 $-650 $-650 $-650 $-650 $-650
TOTAL
income $14484 $23081 $27154 $31348 $52523 $30269
change $135 $-151 $-106 $-335 $-521 $-200
TABLE 3. Income Transfers Based on Race
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better than another policy, we must therefore decide whether to put
more weight on the most disadvantaged workers on the lowest or on the
second-lowest educational level. This balancing opens as much room for
quarrels as therewas for controversy about the supplementary distributive
principles discussed in the previous section.
Some uncontroversial policy comparisons, however, can garner the
support of any opportunity principle that gives absolute priority to the
most disadvantaged. ‘Van de Gaer’s policy’ in the same table and ﬁgure
clearly does not exploit the full range of possible transfers that would
make the most disadvantaged as well-off as possible. For both the
‘Cheapest OD-policy’ and ‘Roemer’s policy’ lead to a higher minimal
income at any educational level. To capture this uniform superiority, we
say that a policy φ dominates a policy ψ in opportunity, or that φ opportunity-
dominates ψ if and only if φ is at least as good as ψ conditional on every
combination of relevant characteristics displayed by some individuals and
better conditional on some such combination. An opportunity-dominated
policy is not a plausible candidate for selection because there are
uncontroversially better instruments for aiding the most disadvantaged.
We therefore focus on policies that are opportunity-undominated by any
other feasible policy and which are in this sense opportunity-optimal. The
shaded area in Figure 3 contains exactly the opportunity-undominated
policies when transfers are based exclusively on race (which here happen
to involve only positive transfers to other races).5 The Cheapest OD-policy
and Roemer’s policy mark two corners of this area, while Van de Gaer’s
5 Policies are now of the form φ ∈RK and the set  of feasible policies satisﬁes∑
1≤k≤K max(φk , ρ · φk ) · Nk = 0 where Nk is the number of individuals with irrelevant
characteristic k. Income under policy φ for individuals with characteristics k and l equals
I φkl := Ikl + φk . In our example, φ1, φ2, φ3 represent transfers to whites, blacks and others.
This restriction of feasible policies means that all policies respect Bossert and Fleurbaey’s
(1996) axiom of ‘equal transfer for equal irrelevant characteristics’.
When computing the set of opportunity-undominated policies by brute force,we have to
search the entire set of feasible policies when testing whether a given policy is opportunity-
dominated. The running time required by the brute force algorithm increases quadratically
in the size of the set of feasible policies. Although a more sophisticated algorithm has a
somewhat better performance, the calculation still remains difﬁcult. In the current model,
it is, however, immensely simpliﬁed by the following useful equivalence: A policy φ ∈ 
is undominated in opportunity if and only if (*) every racial group is worst-off at some level of
education (i.e., if for all k there exists some l such that I φkl = mink′ I φk′l ).
Proof : (a) Suppose (*) is false. We have to show that φ is dominated in opportunity. We
know that there exists some k such that, for all l, δl := I φkl − mink′ I φk′l > 0. Let δ := minl δl .
We can now redistribute ρ · δ · Nk > 0 in a positive transfer among all individuals with
irrelevant characteristics other than k, thus increasing their wealth. Hence, φ is dominated
in opportunity. (b) Suppose (*) is true and φ′ ∈  differs from φ. We have to show that φ
is opportunity-undominated. By the budget constraint, there must exist some k such that
φ′k <φk . By (*), there exists some l such that I
φ
kl = mink′ I φk′l . It follows that I
φ′
kl < mink′ I
φ
k′l
and φ′ therefore does not dominate φ in opportunity.
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We note that this equivalence depends only on the following property of the set  of
feasible policies: (**) Whenever φ, φ′ ∈  with φ = φ′, then neither policy dominates the
other, in the sense that neither φ ≥ φ′ nor φ′ ≥ φ. For feasible sets of this nature, it follows
that the use of the maximin instead of the leximin criterion is innocuous.
Redistributive cost is minimised exactly when –φ1 is minimised because all OD-
policies have positive φ2 and φ3 (φ3 is positive exactly if −φ1 > N2N1·ρ · φ2). By the
equivalence proven in the previous footnote, an OD-policy φ renders whites at some
educational level worst-off. Since the difference between white incomes and the
smallest incomes is minimised at the lowest educational level, –φ1 is minimised when
whites at this level obtain the same income as the remainder of the population at
that level. The incomes of individuals in this category are equalised precisely when
14885 + φ1 = 11948 + φ2 = 13129 + φ3. Equivalently, we must have both φ2 = 2937 + φ1
and min (− (N1 · ρ + N2) ·φ1 + 2937 · N2N3 , −
(N1·ρ + N2) ·φ1 + 2937 · N2
N3 · ρ )= 1756 + φ1. This implies φ1 ≈
−501, φ2 ≈ 2436 and φ3 ≈ 1255. The resulting income shows that this policy is undominated
in opportunity (by the above equivalence).
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selection falls outside of this set. After deselecting dominated policies like
Van de Gaer’s, a range of different candidates remains for selection by
additional distributive principles. Compared to the range of all possible
transfers, opportunity concerns have substantially reduced the range of
eligible policies. For reasons of opportunity alone, whites will have to
make relatively moderate payments (between roughly $500 and $2000)
while blacks and others experience substantial increases in their income.
In our example, opportunity concerns also contribute impressively to
the arbitration between outcome criteria that do not distinguish between
just and unjust inequalities. Free-reign utilitarianism, for instance, accepts
all inequalities as long as they maximise ‘the greatest happiness of the
greatest number’. When utility is measured by income and redistribution
is costly, this criterion fails to address any racial inequalities whatsoever,
favouring the status quo without any loss in average income. When
we constrain the utilitarian formula to a choice from the pre-selected
set of opportunity-undominated policies, we force it to address racial
inequalities in a serious manner and arrive at the ‘Cheapest OD-policy’
shown in the table and ﬁgures. The same policy is, in our example, also
selected by an outcome criterion on the opposite end of the ideological
spectrum. Absolute priority for the worst-off accepts no inequalities
unless they maximise the wealth of the worst-off individuals in the entire
population, whatever their relevant or irrelevant characteristics may be.
In our example, the worst-off individuals are always located in the lowest
educational category, regardless of the policy chosen. Absolute priority
for the worst-off therefore also selects the Cheapest OD-policy, equalising
income between the races on the lowest educational level. At least on
this occasion, opportunity concerns are sufﬁcient to reconcile profound
divergences through a more nuanced view of moral relevance and unfair
disadvantage.
While we have here ranked policies by the leximin criterion, we can
pursue the same programme with any other inequality criterion (such
as the Gini coefﬁcient, Atkinson’s measure etc.). In a ﬁrst step, we again
compare how policies perform on the preferred metric conditional on
each relevant characteristic, e.g., levels of education. In a second step,
we then construct an incomplete ranking of policies across all relevant
characteristics and determine dominance relations. Finally, we constrain
policy choices to the set of all policies that are undominated in opportunity
according to our preferred inequality criterion.
6. ROEMER’S AND VAN DE GAER’S RULES
John Roemer pursues the same goal of striking a compromise between
utilitarianism and concern for the worst-off. Combining elements
from both positions, he creates a hybrid ‘utilitarianism for the most
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disadvantaged’. In our example, heﬁrst ranks incomedistributions on each
educational level by their lowest income and then averages these lowest
incomes across all educational levels. If N is the number of individuals
in the population, Ny is the number of individuals with irrelevant
characteristic y and u(φ, y, z) measures the attainment of some good under
policy φ by an individual with a combination y of relevant characteristics
and a combination z of irrelevant characteristics, then Roemer selects a
policy φ that maximizes:
∑
y
Ny
N
· min
z
u(φ, y, z)
When income transfers are based on race alone, Roemer’s criterion
selects the policy that is shown in Table 3 and Figure 2.6 In this
6 We discuss Roemer’s criterion without his method for determining relevant characteristics
by individuals’ quantile of the outcome distribution for each type. We criticised this
method in section 3. Roemer’s and Van de Gaer’s rules are also discussed in Bossert,
Fleurbaey and Van de Gaer (1999) and Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van de Gaer (2003). When
income transfers are based on race alone, we ﬁnd φ1 ≈−1940, φ2 ≈ 9907 and φ3 ≈ 3660,
using algorithms for non-linear optimisation problems. The resulting policy makes whites
uniformly theworst-off.When transfers dependonboth race and educational level, Roemer
maximises
∑
Nl · φ1l within the budget constraint and subject to (+) I φkl = I φk′l for all k, k′, l.
By (+), this target function is maximised exactly when the average population income is
maximized and, equivalently, when the cost of redistribution and therefore the amount
of redistribution is minimised. Roemer’s criterion therefore selects the same policy as
utilitarianism constrained by equal opportunity (cf. section 4).
There are some questions about the appropriate choice of weights in Roemer’s formula.
When transfers depend on the irrelevant characteristic of race alone, this formula tends
to favour rare over frequent irrelevant characteristics. In our example, the criterion makes
blacks, at every level of education except the highest, much better off thanwhites who drop
to the lowest income level throughout (Table 3 and Figure 2). The reason is that a $1 transfer
from blacks to whites would only increase each white’s income by about $0.13, as the share
of whites in the population is much larger than that of blacks. This would improve the
minima at ‘High School, No Degree’, ‘High School, With Degree’ and ‘Associate Degree’.
However, it would worsen the minimum at the highest educational level, ‘BA or more’.
The $1 loss in the minimum at ‘BA or more’ is weighted by the population share of this
educational level, which is 24%. This weighted loss outweighs the $0.13 gain in the other
three minima, since their joint weight is 56%. There are two alternatives to this weighting
method, both of which have serious drawbacks. The ﬁrst is to multiply the outcome of each
combination of relevant and irrelevant characteristics by the number of individuals at that
combination and to maximise:
∑
y
min
z
Nyz
N
· u(φ, y, z)
However, this rule can make the most disadvantaged worse-off than they need be. It
evaluates the status quo, shown in Table 1, at $22,635. Consider the alternative policy
of reducing the income of others at the lowest educational level by $1,182, making them
worst-off at this educational level. This money is not redistributed and no further income
transfers take place. Because there are fewer others than blacks at the lowest educational
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example, Roemer’s policy marks a corner point of the set of opportunity-
undominated policies (Figure 3). When, as we assumed for simplicity’s
sake, all policies have the same behavioural consequences, Roemer’s
functional selects at least one opportunity-optimal policy, but may also be
indifferent between additional policies that are opportunity-dominated.
Since his criterion only considers the lowest income at a given level of
education, it may not be able to distinguish between policies that have
the same effect on the most disadvantaged but have different effects for
the second-most disadvantaged. A policy, for instance, that caps, on each
educational level, incomes at the status quo’s lowest income level, is
opportunity-dominated by the status quo (shown in the upper part of
Table 4). Yet, Roemer’s criterion evaluates this policy at the exact same
value of $25,233 as the status quo and would thus remain indifferent
in a pairwise choice between the status quo and the capping policy. We
will see in the following section that all policies maximising Roemer’s
functional may be both Pareto- and opportunity-dominated when policies
have differential effects on behaviour.
Roemer accepts inequalities in as far as they contribute to the
social objective expressed in his valuation formula. When all indi-
vidual characteristics are considered relevant (or when all individuals
have the same irrelevant characteristics), this criterion reverts to
traditional utilitarianism. When, however, all individual characteristics
are considered irrelevant (or all individuals have the same relevant
characteristics), it prioritises the attainment of the worst-off. From this
perspective, utilitarianism and priority of the worst-off appear to take
extreme and opposite stances on moral relevance. Roemer’s criterion, by
contrast, aims at a more subtle account of morally acceptable inequalities.
level, the weight of this level is now diminished. As a result, the above criterion evaluates
thepolicy at $25,122 and thusprefers it to the status quo, even though it is both opportunity-
and Pareto-dominated by the status quo. The second alternative is to give equal weight to
all relevant characteristics and to maximise:
1
N
·
∑
y
min
z
u(φ, y, z)
This version of the criterion no longer yields classical utilitarianism in the limiting case
when all characteristics are judged relevant (or all individuals have identical irrelevant
characteristics). If we consider transfers based on both race and education, this criterion
equalises the income among individualswith the same education, but gives almost absolute
priority to the rarest form of education (barring high redistributive costs). If we consider an
educational level withmany individuals (say, the 62million individuals with a high-school
degree) and another with few individuals (say, the 14 million individuals with an associate
degree), then any transfer from the 62 million individuals to the 14 million individuals
increases this functional, no matter how poorly off the 14 million are made. In the case of
income transfers based on race alone, we ﬁnd differences from the version in the main text
of less than $1.
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High School High School College Associate Bachelor’s
No Degree w/Degree No Degree Degree or More Total
No response
WHITE
number (’000) 23,816 52,642 31,574 12,218 39,338 159,588
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $25,421
BLACK
number (’000) 4,655 7,581 4,812 1,401 3,398 21,847
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $22,815
OTHER
number (’000) 1,299 1,985 1,541 598 3,093 8,516
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $27,915
TOTAL
number (’000) 29,770 62,208 37,927 14,217 45,829 189,951
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $25,233
Whites from HS Degree to College without Degree
WHITE
number (’000) 23,816 0 84,216 12,218 39,338 159,588
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $26,211
BLACK
number (’000) 4,655 7,581 4,812 1,401 3,398 21,847
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $22,815
OTHER
number (’000) 1,299 1,985 1,541 598 3,093 8,516
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $27,915
TOTAL
number (’000) 29,770 9,566 90,569 14,217 45,829 189,951
income $11,948 $19,934 $22,330 $28,769 $42,361 $25,897
TABLE 4. Responses to Income Cap
In the previous section, we pursued the same idea and constrained the
utilitarian criterion to the set of opportunity-undominated policies. We
found that this constraint was sufﬁcient to reconcile utilitarian reasoning
with priority of the worst-off in our income example. Roemer (1996, 1998)
suggests that his criterion stands somewhere between utilitarianism and
maximisation of the worst outcome. Yet, Figure 3 shows that his criterion
occupies an extreme, rather than intermediate position in the space of
opportunity policies, and lowers both the population average and the
lowest overall income. Roemer burdens the concept of equal opportunity
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with a foreign and controversial distributive principle and thusprevents us
from exploring the consensus that is potentially generated by opportunity
concerns.
The selection rule developed by Dirk Van de Gaer (1993) also blends
the notion of absolute priority to the most worst-off with elements from
utilitarianism. In our example, he ﬁrst calculates the average income of
each race, and thenmaximises the lowest of these averages.More generally,
he selects a policy φ that maximises the objective:
min
z
∑
y
Ny
N
· u(φ, y, z)
Again, we recover utilitarianism when all individual characteristics
are relevant or all individuals have the same irrelevant characteristics.
We recover maximisation of the lowest attainment level when all
characteristics are irrelevant or all individual have the same relevant
characteristics.
Van deGaer’s rule differs sharply fromopportunity dominance in how
it evaluates an individual’s situation. It evaluates, for instance, the situation
of a black individual with an associate degree not by this individual’s own
income level but by the average income of blacks across all educational
levels. Although others with an associate degree receive a lower income
than blackswith the same degree, Van deGaer considers them advantaged
vis a` vis blacks, because their average group income is higher (Table 1).
Opportunity dominance wouldwelcome a transfer of $1 from a black with
an associate degree to an other with an associate degree and prefer it to the
status quo; Van de Gaer’s method would not. As a result, Van de Gaer’s
favoured policy does not dominate the status quo in opportunity and is
also dominated by Roemer’s policy as well as the policy that enjoys the
joint support of opportunity-constrained utilitarianism and the lowest-
income maximisation (Table 3 and Figure 2). By taxing others $650, Van
de Gaer’s policy renders them worst-off at every level of education and
punishes them for advancing on average to a higher educational level
than blacks (the distribution of others’ educational achievement ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates that of blacks).7
7 Van de Gaer in personal communication says he would restrict the applicability
of his criterion to situations in which relevant characteristics are distributed
independently of irrelevant characteristics. In our example, average income among
individuals with the same irrelevant characteristics is equalised exactly if 31426+φ1 =
23306 + φ2 = 30919 + φ3. Equivalently, we must have both φ2 = 8120 + φ1 and min
(− (N1 · ρ + N2) ·φ1 + 8120 · N2N3 , −
(N1 · ρ + N2) ·φ1 + 8120 · N2
N3 · ρ )= 507+φ1. This implies φ1 ≈ −1157,
φ2 ≈ 6963 and φ3 ≈ −650. If we redistribute income by both race and level of education,
there exist inﬁnitely many feasible policies that satisfy Van de Gaer’s criterion. In some of
these policies educatedwhites paymore than uneducatedwhites. Some of these policies are
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Van de Gaer’s approach can perhaps best be interpreted as an attempt
to evaluate the options available to individuals (Ooghe, Schokkaert and
Van de Gaer 2003). Some inequalities may trouble us not because of the
resulting outcomes as such, but because individuals had differential access
to the most promising alternatives. From this perspective, Van de Gaer
appears to infer an individual’s options from the actual range of choices
made by other individuals with the same irrelevant characteristics, e.g.,
race. He then determines the value of this ‘opportunity set’ by the average
beneﬁt that accrues from this range of choices and resolves to maximise
this value. However, this technique does not apply when we consider
factors as relevant that are not fully under an individual’s control. In our
example, it makes little sense to equate the value of a white person’s
opportunity set with the average income obtained bywhites, since highest
levels of educational attainment will not be attainable by whites who
lack the required intellectual abilities. It is, of course, difﬁcult to infer an
individuals’ option set and even harder to appraise its value (Weymark
2001). Were we able to solve this problem, we could straightforwardly
deﬁne the values of option sets as the good to be distributed and thus
incorporate the availability of options into the notion of opportunity
dominance.
7. BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSES
We have so far worked under the simplifying assumption that individuals
show no behavioural responses to policy interventions. In the example
of lump-sum transfers based on race and education, we assumed that
all individuals maintain their current level of education regardless of
the transfer payments they make or receive. In reality, different taxation
policies vary in their effect on high-school, college and university
attendance, through different marginal returns to education. We will
now discuss how to evaluate the behavioural responses evoked by
policy instruments. In particular, we will address differences in the
interpretation and applicability of opportunity-optimality and the ‘Strong
Pareto Principle’ which requires us to make an individual better off if
doing so makes nobody worse off (‘Pareto-optimality’, for short). The
contrast between Pareto-optimality and opportunity principles becomes
apparentwhen policies differentially affect the number of individualswith
a particular relevant characteristic.
opportunity-dominated and some are not. Van de Gaer’s criterion can easily be rendered
Pareto-optimal by evaluating policies not only by their effect on the lowest average income
but also by their effect on the second-lowest average income etc. We would then evaluate
an individual’s situation by the average income of individuals with the same irrelevant
characteristics and then apply the leximin rule to this measure.
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In such cases, Roemer’s criterion stands in stark opposition to both
opportunity- and Pareto-optimality. We return to the capping policy that
ﬁxes each educational category’s income at its lowest income level in the
status quo. We suppose that all whites with a high-school degree respond
to this income by advancing to the next higher educational level, i.e.,
college attendance without a degree (shown in the lower part of Table 4).
Through this educational advance, individuals increase their income
from $19,934 to $22,330, leaving them still $23,822− $22,330= $1,492
poorer than they were in the status quo with less education. By the
lights of both Pareto- and, as we shall see, opportunity-optimality, the
capping policy is therefore worse than the status quo. Yet, educationally
advancing individuals shift their weight away from certiﬁed high-school
attendance towards uncertiﬁed college attendance. Since the differential
between the lowest income at these educational levels is positive ($22,330 –
$19,934= $2,396), the shifted weights increase the value that Roemer’s
criterion ascribes to the capping policy. If all whites with a high-school
degree were to proceed to the next higher educational level, they would
shift a weight of 52,642/18,9951= 27.7% and thereby increase the value of
the capping policy by 27.7%. $2,396= $664 above the status quo.
Roemer’s criterion also opposes opportunity-dominancewhich, in this
case, aligns itself with Pareto-dominance. In our hypothetical scenario, the
capping policy prompts about 91 million people to attend college without
earning a degree and gives them an income of $22,300. In the status quo
only about 38 million people attend college without earning a degree.
About 2 million of these earn the same low income of $22,330, while the
remaining 36 million earn a substantially higher income. In other words,
the status quo makes the 2 million most disadvantaged individuals in
this educational tranche as well-off as the capping policy, but makes all
remaining individuals in this tranche better off. On the level of uncertiﬁed
college attendance, the conditional leximin ranking of section 5 therefore
strictly prefers the status quo over the capping policy. Since the same is
true of all other educational levels, the status quo opportunity-dominates
the capping policy. Roemer’s criterion has thus selected a policy that falls
outside the set of opportunity-optimal candidates. A fortiori, this example
thwarts any attempt to render Roemer’s criterion Pareto- or opportunity-
optimal in the presence of behavioural responses.8
8 Roemer’s criterion thus prefers a Pareto-dominated policy. Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van
de Gaer (2003) point out that Roemer’s criterion satisﬁes the strong Pareto principle only
when all individuals maintain the same relevant characteristics under any policy. The same
authors also suggest that, for each relevant characteristic, we replace theminimumoperator
in Roemer’s formula with some inequality measure, such as some suitable Atkinson
measure, that puts a large weight on the worst-off individual with that characteristic,
but which also increases monotonically with improvements in the income of the second-,
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On this particular occasion, opportunity-optimality sidedwith Pareto-
optimality. It is also generally true that both dominance relations run in the
same direction, i.e., that one policy cannot Pareto-dominate another if the
latter opportunity-dominates the former. The two principles are, however,
logically independent and one principle may regard two policies as
incomparablewhile the other expresses a strict preference.9 Such situations
can arise even for policies that inﬂuence behaviour through information
and encouragement, but do not engage in income redistributions. Suppose
the policy-maker thoroughly informs the most highly educated white
individuals of the pathological link between exposure to stress and the in-
creased likelihood of cardiac diseases. Let us hypothetically suppose
that, with such information, all 39 million individuals in this category
arrest their education at the level of an associate degree and drop to an
income of $32,116. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that all remaining
third- etc. most disadvantaged. By the same logic as above, averaging such inequality
measures can lead to preference for some Pareto-dominated policy whenwe allow changes
in individuals’ relevant characteristics. Indeed, the comparisons of inequalities across
groups of different sizes poses well-known difﬁculties for inequality measures (Sen 1973).
9 We ﬁrst claim that ψ does not Pareto-dominate φ, neither in the strong nor in the weak sense, if φ
opportunity-dominates ψ . Proof : Suppose that φ opportunity-dominates ψ , while ψ Pareto-
dominatesφ in the strong sense, i.e.ψ is at least as good asφ for all individuals and better for
some. For any individual n (1 ≤ n ≤ N), deﬁne u(n) := u(φ, yn, zn) and v(n) :=u(ψ, yn, zn).
We will show (∗) that, for all n (1 ≤ n ≤ N), there exist permutations σ, τ of {1, . . . , N}
such that (i) u ◦ σ (1) ≤ . . . ≤ u ◦ σ (N), (ii) v ◦ τ (1) ≤ . . . ≤ v ◦ τ (N), and (iii) σ (k)= τ (k) and
u ◦ σ (k)= v ◦ σ (k) = u ◦ σ (n) for all 1≤ k ≤n. We ﬁrst show that the claim holds for n= 1.
Let σ, τ be permutations that satisfy (i) and (ii). Let j := σ (1) and i := τ (1). By opportunity-
dominance, u( j) ≥ v(i). By Pareto-dominance, we have v(i) ≥ u(i) and, by (i), v(i) ≥ u( j).
Hence, v(i)= u(i)=u( j). Let σ ′ agree with σ except for interchanging the position of i and
j (i.e., except for σ ′(1) := i and σ ′(σ−1(i)) := j). σ ′ and τ now satisfy conditions (i)–(iii).
Assuming that the claim holds for n, wewill now establish it for n + 1 ≤ N. Let i := τ (n + 1)
and j := σ (n + 1) and assume that u( j) > v(i). By Pareto-dominance, u( j) > v(i) ≥ u(i)
and, by (i), there exists some 1 ≤ k ≤ n with σ (k)= i . By (iii), τ (k) = i and, since τ is
a permutation, we cannot have i = τ (n + 1). By reductio, we conclude that u( j) ≤ v(i).
Opportunity-dominance implies u( j) ≥ v(i). We thus obtain u( j) = v(i) and, by Pareto-
dominance and (i), v(i)= u(i). Let σ ′ agree with σ except for interchanging the position of i
and j (i.e., except for σ ′(n + 1) := i and σ ′(σ−1(i)) := j). σ ′ and τ now satisfy conditions (i)–
(iii) of the claim. Having established claim (∗), we note that it contradicts Pareto-dominance
(and, for that matter, opportunity-dominance). Hence, our assumption is refuted and the
proof completed. 
Second, we show the logical independence of Pareto- and opportunity dominance.
Consider one relevant factor Y with values y1, y2 and one irrelevant factor Z with values
z1, z2. Let there be three individuals 1, 2, 3 and deﬁne the following three policies: Under φ1,
1 has characteristics (y1, z1), 2 has (y2, z1), 3 has (y2, z2), u(φ1, y1, z1) = 1, u(φ1, y2, z1) = 1
and u(φ1, y2, z2) = 3. Under φ2, 1 has characteristics (y1, z1), 2 has (y2, z1), 3 has (y1, z2),
u(φ2, y1, z1) = 1, u(φ2, y2, z1) = 1, and u(φ2, y1, z2) = 2. Under φ3, 1 has characteristics
(y1, z2), 2 has (y2, z1), 3 has (y1, z1), u(φ3, y1, z1) = 1,u(φ3, y2, z1) = 0, and u(φ3, y1, z2) = 2.
With these deﬁnitions, φ1 Pareto-dominates (but does not opportunity-dominate) φ2 and
φ2 opportunity-dominates (but does not Pareto-dominate) φ3.
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individuals show no behavioural changes and earn the same income as
in the status quo of Table 1. Thus, the information policy has no effect on
the 14 million individuals who hold an associate degree in the status quo.
The ﬁrst, second, . . . , and 14 million-th most disadvantaged individual
on this educational level is therefore equally well-off under either policy.
However, the 14 million and ﬁrst individual (roughly speaking) with an
associate degree under the information policy has no counterpart in the
status quo. It is therefore not clear on what basis we can compare these
policies and, according to our deﬁnition of opportunity-dominance, the
policies remain incomparable. At the same time, Pareto-optimality strictly
prefers the status quo over the information policy because some whites
drop to a lower income level while everyone else is unaffected.
The divergence of the opportunity- and the Pareto-principle stems to
a large extent from the good we are considering for redistribution. Income
is not a comprehensive measure of an individual’s well-being. Instead,
people also value leisure, health and even some relevant characteristics,
such as education, in their own right. The decreases in income that result
from individuals’ responses to the information policy are accompanied
by beneﬁts that are not reﬂected in monetary earnings. In fact, such
additional beneﬁts partly account for the behavioural responses to a policy.
If individuals voluntarily drop to a lower level of education and income,
they presumably maximise their well-being (if they are well informed and
rational). While one would surely want to increase an individual’s well-
being if this can be done at nobody’s expense, a decrease in monetary
earnings without any offsetting increases is not a sufﬁcient reason to reject
the information policy. In general terms, the Pareto principle loses much
of its cogency when applied to units of some commodity rather than to
some comprehensive measure of well-being. In so far as opportunities
are concerned, the weakness of the Pareto principle is its exclusive focus
on individuals’ outcomes regardless of the relevant characteristics that
lead to these outcomes. Opportunity dominance instead evaluates the
effect of policies conditional on relevant characteristics whichmay include
individuals’ choices in response to policy interventions. Opportunity
principles are thus concerned with individuals’ outcomes only in as far
as they reﬂect unfair advantages and disadvantages.
8. CONCLUSION
Our purpose was to help structure the political debate in which the goal
of equal opportunity receives continued support, but is given conﬂicting
interpretations. We held that some notion of moral relevance or of just and
unjust inequalities lies at the heart of any concrete opportunity principle.
One’s concrete notion of moral relevance and one’s stance on the inﬂuence
of irrelevant on relevant factors will depend both on societal context
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and on the good to be allocated. Starting from this generic deﬁnition of
equal opportunity, we have then introduced opportunity dominance as a
criterion that prioritises the most disadvantaged.
These opportunity principles aim to mitigate the differential effects of
irrelevant factors, but remain agnostic about the appropriate inﬂuence
of relevant factors. They thus avoid commitments to controversial
distributive principles about how relevant characteristics ought to be
rewarded. We have shown by example what beneﬁts such impartiality
may bring. On the basis of some shared conception of moral relevance, we
have illustrated the ability of opportunity principles to arbitrate certain
philosophical differences about distributive justice, to the point that these
disagreements become smaller, or even disappear.
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